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A

S THE UNITED
States struggles to
contain the spread
of COVID-19,
epidemiological
surveillance programs like digital
contact tracing have been touted as
a critical tool to enable states not
only to reopen their economies,
but also to do so without a
resurgence of infections. During
May and June 2020, members
of Congress introduced multiple
bills to regulate data collection,
processing, and use in connection
with the COVID-19 pandemic,
including for digital contact tracing.
Contact tracing has long been a
central component of public health
response to infectious disease.
Traditionally, a contact tracer
interviews infected individuals
to identify all other individuals
with whom they may have been
in contact. A contact tracer
then notifies these contacts that
they may be infected, assists in
monitoring for symptoms, and may
instruct contacts to quarantine.
Traditional contact tracing
thus relies on skilled workers.
Done well, contact tracing, in
combination with widespread
testing and quarantining of
contacts, can short circuit
pathways of infection. As of June
2020, more than 1,400 contact
tracers were already at work
throughout the state of Maryland.
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Many jurisdictions have also
expressed interest in utilizing
digital data to assist the work
of human contact tracers, if not
replace it. Should the United
States—or any individual state—
embrace digital contact tracing,
and how might such a program
be structured to maximize its
asserted benefits while limiting
its harms? In a recent paper, my
Maryland Carey Law colleague
David Gray and I argue that the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution supplies an answer.
The Fourth Amendment
guarantees that “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be
violated.” This protection likely
regulates the use of location data
for epidemiological purposes,
as private app developers are
likely to be deemed state agents
for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. Policymakers
nonetheless have substantial
latitude to develop these
epidemiological programs
within the broad constraints of
the “special needs” doctrine.
Significantly, special needs
searches generally do not require a
warrant.
But the special doctrine does
not sign a constitutional blank
check, permitting unregulated and
mass digital location tracking.
The Fourth Amendment requires
prospective constraints on
searches and the discretionary
authority of agents to conduct
them. Policymakers must ask hard
questions about efficacy, including
the comparative advantages of
digital location tracking versus

more traditional contact tracing
methods. There are good reasons
to be skeptical. Current consumer
location tracking tools—
whether GPS or Bluetooth—are
insufficiently precise to capture
only close contacts, and they
cannot account for beneficial
features like mask wearing.
Moreover, a lack of robust social
supports may make quarantine
economically infeasible for many.
Without appropriate technological
and social infrastructure, digital
contact tracing is likely to sacrifice
substantial privacy for only a myth
of public health benefit.
Even if the public health
benefits of digital contact
tracing can be established, the
Fourth Amendment requires
that policymakers take threats
to privacy seriously. Robust
programmatic safeguards must be
put in place to secure both privacy
and liberty, including limitations
on data gathering, aggregation,
storage, access, analysis, and
use. In particular, data gathered
and stored for contact tracing
must not be used beyond its
justified purpose. Permitting
law enforcement or immigration
officials to access this data would
both undermine public trust
(and hence the efficacy of any
program) and make such searches
constitutionally unjustified.
Finally, policymakers must set
clear plans for decommissioning
surveillance programs. Under
such a framework, we may yet
achieve legitimate public health
goals as we face COVID-19 while
also living up to our constitutional
commitments. ■
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